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"Livres en folie", c'est reparti !
Concours de plaidoirie. Etudiants de 1ère année de master droit, inscrivez-vous au concours de plaidoirie
Séminaire du lundi 14 décembre 2015
Martin Van der Linden présentera un travail intitulé “Leveling the Playing Field in Jury Selection” en salle des séminaires (10h30-12h).
Abstract. Procedures of jury selection in trials often allow the parties to veto some of the potential jurors. In these procedures, the parties are faced with complicated strategical issues with regards to the use of their vetoes. This induces an undesirable unbalance between parties with good strategic skills, and parties with limited strategic abilities. Van der Linden (2015, forthcoming) shows that this is a general feature of procedures allowing for vetoes. However, not all procedures are equal in terms of the extent of this unbalance. We develop a criterion to compare procedures in terms of the incentives they give to use vetoes strategically, and apply this criterion to the most common jury selection procedures. In particular, we show that a reform of the selection procedure undertaken in Tennessee in 2003 can be viewed as reducing the incentive to use vetoes strategically.